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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a deep multi-speaker text-to-speech
(TTS) model for spoofing speaker verification (SV) systems.
The proposed model employs one network to synthesize time-
downsampled mel-spectrograms from text input and another
network to convert them to linear-frequency spectrograms,
which are further converted to the time domain using the
Griffin-Lim algorithm. Both networks are trained separately
under the generative adversarial networks (GAN) framework.
Spoofing experiments on two state-of-the-art SV systems (i-
vectors and Google’s GE2E) show that the proposed system
can successfully spoof these systems with a high success
rate. Spoofing experiments on anti-spoofing systems (i.e., bi-
nary classifiers for discriminating real and synthetic speech)
also show a high spoof success rate when such anti-spoofing
systems’ structures are exposed to the proposed TTS system.
Index Terms— Text-to-speech, speaker verification,
spoofing, generative adversarial networks, anti-spoofing
1. INTRODUCTION
Speaker verification (SV) is to verify whether a claim that an
utterance belongs to a speaker is true or not. It is a widely
used biometric and has been under research for decades.
One widely used traditional method uses Gaussian mixture
models (GMM) with a universal background model (UBM)
[1]. Later, i-vectors method was proposed, which maps high-
dimensional statistics from the UBM into a low-dimensional
representation [2]. Recently, deep learning methods have
shown significant advances on verification accuracy over
traditional methods [3, 4, 5, 6].
Similar to verification systems using other biometrics,
SV systems face the problem of fake identification which is
termed as presentation attack or spoofing. Spoofing has two
main forms. One is physical access (PA) including direct im-
itation and replay. The other is logical access (LA) including
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speech synthesis and voice conversion. This paper focuses
on the spoofing effects of text-to-speech (TTS) synthesis on
SV systems. TTS has been investigated for decades. Early
methods use unit selection [7], formant synthesis [8], and
hidden Markov models (HMM) [9], among others. Spoofing
effects of synthetic speech from these traditional methods has
been investigated in [10, 11]. Recent years have witnessed
the surge of deep learning speech synthesis models such as
WaveNet [12] and Tacotron [13]; they can generate speech
that is hard to be distinguished from real speech by listen-
ing. However, spoofing effects of synthetic speech from deep
learning models have not been properly investigated [14].
In [15], a voice conversion (VC) system is proposed to
spoof SV systems. It is trained using feedback from black-
box SV systems for better spoofing effects. For TTS sys-
tems, a deep learning model based on GAN [16] is proposed
to spoof an SV system by synthesizing mel-spectrograms.
While promising results are reported, the spoofed SV system
takes mel-spectrograms as input instead of time-domain sig-
nals. This is impractical in real life. In [17], another GAN
system is proposed to design a TTS system, which incorpo-
rates an anti-spoofing system as the discriminator. This sys-
tem, however, is only evaluated on the feature distributions
of the synthetic speech with and without GAN training; no
evaluation is performed on spoofing SV systems.
In this paper, we propose a Wasserstein GAN-based
multi-speaker TTS system based on an existing TTS [18] ar-
chitecture to spoof SV systems1. This system consists of two
sub-models. The first model synthesizes a time-downsampled
mel-spectrogram from text input using speaker embeddings
of the target identity. The second model then converts the
mel-specrogram to a linear-frequency spectrogram and fi-
nally to the time domain using the Griffin-Lim algorithm
[19]. We perform adversarial training for each sub-model.
Experiments are conducted on spoofing two state-of-the-art
SV systems (i-vectors and Google GE2E) in a black-box con-
dition, and results show a high spoof rate of the proposed
TTS system.
1Source code at https://github.com/MingruiYuan/SpoofSV
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Our contributions are the following: 1) We proposed a
multi-speaker TTS spoofing system using Wasserstein GAN
training; 2) Comprehensive spoofing experiments showed
a high spoof rate on two state-of-the-art SV systems in the
black-box condition; 3) Our experiments also uncovered
threats of TTS spoofing to anti-spoofing SV systems when
their model structures are not kept confidential.
2. TEXT-TO-SPEECH MODEL
Our proposed TTS model follows the two-stage process in
[18]. In the first stage we use a Text2Mel network to con-
vert the input text into a time-downsampled mel-spectrogram
“spoken” by the target speaker. In the second stage we use
a Spectrogram Super-resolution Network (SSRN) to con-
vert the time-downsampled mel-spectrogram into the linear-
frequency spectrogram. The Text2Mel model works in an
online fashion: it processes acoustic features frame by frame.
Previously generated frames of the features are fed back as
input to Text2Mel to generate the next frame.
2.1. Text2Mel Network
Text2Mel consists of a text encoder (TEnc), an audio and
speaker encoder (ASEnc) and an audio decoder (ADec).
TEnc takes text embeddings as inputs. The text embeddings
are obtained by mapping each character through a trainable
lookup table. These embeddings are then processed by sub-
sequent layers of TEnc to obtain output tensorK,V. ASEnc
has two input branches. One accepts the time-downsampled
mel-spectrogram of previously generated audio frames and
the other accepts the speaker embedding of the target speaker
extracted by the Deep Speaker model [5]. The two branches
are added together and then processed by subsequent layers
to obtain an output tensorQ.
Attention mechanism is employed to align the text input
and the generated mel-spectrogram. This is implemented
through a trainable attention matrix A with size N × T ,
where N is the total number of characters of the text input
and T is the total number of frames of the to-be-generated
mel-spectrogram. Ant is the probability of the tth frame of
the mel-spectrogram being generated from the nth character
of the input text. As the alignment between text and its speech
utterance is monotonic, during generation, we do not allow
the alignment path to move backward in either dimension. In
addition, we do not allow the path to skip 2 or more positions,
leaving a valid step size of 0, 1 or 2 in both dimensions. This
ensures a roughly continuous alignment path but also allows
speed changes in the synthesized speech.
Finally, ADec takes a concatenated tensor [VA;Q] as in-
put and predicts a new frame of the time-downsampled mel-
spectrogram in each time step, which is then appended to the
generated spectrogram and fed to ASEnc in the next time step.
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Fig. 1. The proposed text-to-speech model. Architecture of
ASEnc is illustrated, while that of TEnc, ADec and SSRN
follows the same structure as that in [18].
In all modules of Text2Mel, 1D dilated convolutional lay-
ers are used to model short and long contextual information.
Highway convolutional layers are applied according to high-
way networks [20] to improve training efficiency. Detailed
structure of ASEnc is shown in Figure 1, while that of TEnc,
ADec and SSRN follow the same structure as that in [18].
2.2. Spectrogram Super-resolution Network (SSRN)
SSRN converts the time-downsampled mel-spectrogram from
Text2Mel to the linear-frequency spectrogram. It uses trans-
pose convolutional layers and a series of 1D dilated convolu-
tional layers to achieve this super resolution along both time
and frequency axes. Finally, Griffin-Lim algorithm [19] is
used to estimate the phase spectrogram to obtain the time-
domain waveform of the generated speech.
2.3. Training
Training of Text2Mel and SSRN is performed separately, as
shown in Figure 1. Training of Text2Mel requires pairs of
text and time-downsampled mel-spectrograms, while training
of SSRN only requires pairs of time-downsampled mel-
spectrograms and linear-frequency spectrograms. As both
networks only consist of 1D dilated convolutional layers,
sequential models are avoided and all frames of each time-
downsampled mel-spectrogram can be reconstructed at the
same time with teacher-forcing in the training stage. This is
the key to better training efficiency. The reconstruction loss
functions for Text2Mel and SSRN are formulated as
LText2MelRecon = Eft[|Ymel − Smel|]
+ Eft[−SmellogYmel − (1− Smel)log(1−Ymel)]
+ Lattention,
(1)
LSSRNRecon = Eft[|Ylin − Slin|]
+ Eft[−SlinlogYlin − (1− Slin)log(1−Ylin)],
(2)
where Y denotes the reconstructed (mel-)spectrogram and S
denotes the corresponding ground-truth. Both models use
the L1 and cross-entropy losses to assess the reconstruction
quality. For Text2Mel, it also includes an attention loss term
Lattention = Ent[A W], where the weight matrix Wnt =
1 − e−( nN− tT )2 shows a high weight off diagonal. This term
penalizes the attention matrix A if it contains significant en-
ergy off diagonal. The rationale is that the alignment between
text and its speech utterance is usually along the diagonal, as-
suming a stable speaking speed.
When training the two sub-models we also incorporate
discriminators that are trained to discriminate real and syn-
thetic (mel-)spectrograms. The discriminators consist of 1D
convolutional layers, highway convolutional layers, and 1D
(adaptive) average pooling layers. Model details are omitted
due to space limit but can be found in the open source code.
We use Wasserstein GAN with gradient penalty (WGAN-
GP) [21] because it achieves better results than the vanilla
GAN in our experiments. Therefore, the output of each dis-
criminator is a confidence value; A (mel-)spectrogram with a
higher value is more likely to be real. The final loss function
for Text2Mel and SSRN becomes: [22]
L = LRecon +
ELRecon
ELGAN
LGAN , (3)
where LRecon is the reconstruction loss function of each sub-
model in Eqs. (1) and (2), while LGAN is the loss from the
discriminator. The two parts in the loss function are normal-
ized by their averages in each batch to have the same weight.
3. EXPERIMENTS
3.1. Training Spoofing Models
We use the entire VCTK-corpus [23] to train our TTS model.
This corpus contains 108 valid English speakers (p315 is
eliminated for the absence of texts) and each speaker has
around 400 utterances (∼0.5 hour). All audio files are down-
sampled from 48 kHz to 22.05 kHz and all texts are converted
to lower case. We use STFT with a hanning window of size
i-vectors GE2E
SR EER SR EER
M1
S1 42.12% 1.97% 57.90% 19.35%
S2 42.40% 1.88% 77.36% 18.64%
S3 26% 1.5% 60.69% 18.57%
M2
S1 70.15% 2.42% 62.39% 19.06%
S2 72.08% 2.08% 80.20% 18.49%
S3 41% 0.5% 65.07% 18.73%
M3
S1 74.47% 2.27% 69.80% 19.88%
S2 66.98% 1.67% 72.48% 19.68%
S3 57% 1.5% 69.16% 17.19%
Average 54.69% 1.75% 68.34% 18.74%
Table 1. Spoofing effects on speaker verification systems us-
ing three trained models (M1, M2, M3) of the proposed TTS
system with three data split schemes (S1, S2, S3).
1024 and hop size 256 to calculate the spectrogram. For
the time-downsampled mel-spectrogram, we use 80 mel fil-
terbanks, and select 1 frame out of every 4 frames. The
optimizer is Adam [24] with α = 2e−4, β1 = 0.5, β2 = 0.9
and batch size is 16. For every update of the generator, the
discriminator is updated for 5 times. We set the gradient
penalty coefficient λ = 10. Layer normalization [25] is ap-
plied before each activation function as we found it useful in
the experiments. We select three models trained for different
number of iterations to perform experiments: M1 (Text2Mel)
500k-(SSRN) 300k. M2 700k-500k. M3 1000k-800k.
3.2. Spoofing Effects on SV Systems
We choose two state-of-the-art SV systems to spoof: i-vectors
[2] provided by Kaldi and an open source implementa-
tion [26] of Google’s deep learning system GE2E [6]. We
also use the VCTK corpus to train the SV systems. We split
speakers in the corpus into training and test sets with three
different schemes: S1 (Train) 42-(Test) 66. S2 60-48. S3
88-20. We use the default settings of Kaldi’s aishell example
and the GE2E github repository to train the SV systems.
To investigate spoofing effects, we create a mixed set con-
taining 50% real and 50% synthetic utterances to perform
speaker verification. We randomly select 3 real utterances of
each test speaker for enrollment. We then randomly choose
another 20 real utterances and 20 synthetic utterances of each
speaker for verification. The synthetic utterances are synthe-
sized by the proposed TTS system on Harvard Sentences.
We propose spoof rate (SR) to quantify the spoofing ef-
fects. It is defined as the percentage of synthetic speech ut-
terances that are accepted by the SV system as their claimed
identities. Apparently, SR is affected by the threshold tuning
of SV systems. In this experiment, we tune the SV systems
to achieve equal error rate (EER) on real speech utterances in
the test set. In Table 1, we report SR of all the three models
Fig. 2. Spoof rate (horizontal axis) vs. false rejection rate
(FRR) (vertical axis) of the three trained models (M1, M2,
M3) on three data split schemes (S1, S2, S3). SV systems:
i-vectors (blue solid line), GE2E (red dash line).
in the three train-test split schemes. We also report EER on
real utterances as a control measure of the performance of the
SV systems. From Table 1, we can see that all of the three
models trained with the three data split schemes achieved a
high spoof rate on both SV systems. The average spoof rate
is 54.69% for i-vectors and 68.34% for GE2E. This shows the
significant vulnerability of both SV systems under the attack
of our TTS system. The EER on real utterances of i-vectors is
below 2.5% in all settings, showing that the SV system is well
trained. The EER of GE2E is much higher, suggesting that it
is not well trained on our limited dataset. In fact, according
to the GE2E’s paper [6], 18K speakers are used to train the
model. Our training set, however, has less than 100 speakers
for all the three data split schemes. It is possible that a better
trained GE2E model could be more robust to our TTS attack,
and more investigations are needed to draw this conclusion.
In Figure 2, we vary the threshold of SV systems and
plot the curve of spoof rate versus false rejection rate (FRR),
where a false rejection is defined as the rejection of a real
speech utterance that indeed belongs to the claimed identity.
An ideal SV system that is robust to spoofing would show
a monotonically decreasing curve very close to the origin.
Curves in Figure 2, however, have a certain distance to the
origin for all models and data split schemes. Take the M3-S3
i-vectors curve as an example, to lower the SR below 10%, the
FRR would be as high as 15%, which would not be accept-
able in practice. This again shows vulnerability of i-vectors
and GE2E under the attack of our proposed TTS system.
3.3. Spoofing Effects on Anti-spoofing Systems
We further evaluate the proposed TTS model by spoofing anti-
spoofing systems. Here, the anti-spoofing systems are binary
classifiers that discriminate real from synthetic speech. We
perform this evaluation in two conditions. In the blackbox
condition, the anti-spoofing system is treated as a blackbox
and its model structure is not revealed to the TTS system.
In the whitebox condition, the model structure of the anti-
spoofing system is revealed. The anti-spoofing systems make
two types of errors: 1) false acceptance of synthetic speech,
and 2) false rejection of real speech. As the test set contains
equal amount of real and synthetic utterances, we report the
equal error rate (EER) as the evaluation measure.
For the blackbox condition, we choose the ASVspoof2019
provided GMM-based anti-spoofing system. It takes Lin-
ear Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (LFCC) as input fea-
tures, and is trained on the logical access (LA) part of the
ASVspoof2019 dataset [27]. We compose two test sets, each
of which is a mix of real speech utterances (50%) and syn-
thetic utterances (50%). The difference is on the synthetic
utterances. For the first setTSproposed, they are synthesized
by the proposed TTS model. For the second set TSothers,
they are downloaded from https://google.github.io/tacotron/
and are synthesized using other high-quality TTS models.
The resulted EER is 0.47% on TSproposed and 3.74% on
TSothers. These low values shows the difficulty of spoofing
anti-spoofing systems in the blackbox condition.
For the whitebox condition, we choose two variants V1
and V2 of the discriminator that we use in the GAN train-
ing of our model as the anti-spoofing system. Each variant
has a similar structure to the original discriminator, with dif-
ferences on the removal of an average pooling layer and the
insertion of a convolutional layer, respectively. We use test
set TSproposed to spoof V1 and V2. The resulted EER is
42.56% for V1 and 36.21% for V2. These high EER val-
ues show that both anti-spoofing systems fail to discriminate
synthetic from real speech. This suggests that anti-spoofing
systems, when their structures are disclosed, can be very vul-
nerable to TTS spoofing attacks.
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposed a deep multi-speaker TTS model for
spoofing SV systems. GAN training was employed to train
the two sub-models of the system. Experiments on spoof-
ing state-of-the-art SV systems revealed their significant
vulnerability under the attack of the proposed TTS system.
Experiments on anti-spoofing systems also revealed their vul-
nerability if their model structures are disclosed. For future
work, we plan to use reinforcement learning to improve the
spoofing capability on blackbox SV systems. We also plan to
design stronger anti-spoofing systems to defend TTS attack.
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